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1. Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Networks closely resemble a human behaviour model, in which a number 
of nodes that have just met are able to communicate with each other based on mutual trust 
levels developed over a period of time. WSNs are characterised by their performance of an 
additional function to the traditional functions of an ad-hoc network, which is monitoring 
events and reporting data and, as such, the sensed data represent the core component of 
trust-modelling in this research.  
 
The trust-modelling problem in wireless networks is characterised by uncertainty. It is a 
decision problem under uncertainty and the only coherent way to deal with uncertainty is 
through probability. There are several frameworks for reasoning under uncertainty, but it is 
well accepted that the probabilistic paradigm is the theoretically sound framework for 
solving a decision problem involving uncertainty. Some of the trust models introduced for 
sensor networks employ probabilistic solutions mixed with ad-hoc approaches. None of 
them produces a full probabilistic answer to the problem. Each node's reliability is an 
unknown quantity. The ensuing decision problems concern is which nodes are to be trusted. 
It is these decision problems; regarding when to terminate nodes, that motivate research in 
trust models.  
 
We look at applying trust evaluation to WSNs, providing continuous data in the form of a 
new reputation system we call GTRSSN: Gaussian Trust and Reputation System for Sensor 
Networks. It has been argued that previous studies on WSNs focused on the trust associated 
with the routing and the successful performance of a sensor node in some predetermined 
task. This resulted in looking at binary events. The trustworthiness and reliability of the 
nodes of a WSN, when the sensed data are continuous, has not been addressed. Our main 
contribution is therefore the introduction of a statistical approach; a theoretically sound 
Bayesian probabilistic approach for modelling trust in WSNs in the case of continuous 
sensor data; that is, we derive a Bayesian probabilistic reputation system and trust model for 
WSNs, as presented in our work in (Momani et al., 2007a) and (Momani et al., 2007b). 
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2. Node Misbehaviour Classification 
The main idea behind reputation and trust-based systems is to discover and exclude 
misbehaving nodes and to minimise the damage caused by inside attackers. Node 
misbehaviour can be classified in two categories: communication misbehaviour and data 
misinforming. Most of the researchers classify node misbehaviour in the same way they 
model trust: from the communication point of view. However, as discussed so far, WSNs 
are deployed to sense events and report data, so the node misbehaviour diagram presented 
in (Srinivasan et al., 2007) is extended by introducing a new branch addressing sensor data 
misbehaviour; misinforming, as a second category of nodes’ misbehaviour classification in 
WSNs, as illustrated below in Figure 1, to reflect the way trust is being modelled here. 
 
 Fig. 1. Node misbehaviour classification 
 
As can be seen from the diagram in Figure 1, the new branch dealing with sensor data 
includes the misinforming behaviour of a sensor node. This can be caused due to a faulty 
node, a node that is damaged or has expired, or due to a noise, as sensor data are not 
without noise, a malicious node or environment. The node might have been captured or the 
environment is malfunctioning or there might have been a communication failure, or there 
has been interference or the communication between nodes is cut off for some reason. The 
communication misbehaviour classification is due to the node being malicious, an intruder 
attacking and damaging the network, or the node is selfish, trying to save resources for later 
usage. Further detailed information regarding the node misbehaviour communication 
branch is provided in (Srinivasan et al., 2006). 
 
3. Modelling Trust 
Initially, the primary focus of the research on trust in WSNs was on whether a node will detect 
appropriately, will or will not report the detected event(s), and will route information. The 
uncertainty in these actions warranted the development of reputation systems and 
corresponding trust models. Modelling trust in general is the process of representing the 
trustworthiness of one node in the opinion of another node, that is, how much one node trusts 
every other node in the surrounding area, and it has been the focus of many researchers from 
different domains. In other words, trust-modelling is simply the mathematical representation 
of a node’s opinion of another node in a network. Figure 2 below shows the two main sources 
for trust formation in WSNs: the observation of the behaviour of the surrounding nodes, direct 
trust and the recommendation from other nodes, indirect trust. 
 Fig. 2. Trust computational model for WSN 
 
3.1. Direct Observations 
A node will observe a neighbouring node's behaviour and build a reputation for that node 
based on the observed data. The neighbouring node’s transactions data are direct 
observations referred to as first-hand information. By their nature, the considered events are 
binary, and the mathematical trust models developed for WSNs are for binary transactions. 
We argue that the problem of assessing a reputation based on observed data is a statistical 
problem. Some trust models make use of this observation and introduce a probabilistic 
modelling. For example, the reputation-based framework for high integrity sensor networks 
(RFSN) trust model presented in (Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004) by Ganeriwal and 
Srivastava uses a Bayesian updating scheme known as the Beta Reputation System for 
assessing and updating the nodes’ reputations. The Beta reputation system was introduced 
by Josang and Ismail (Jøsang & Ismail, 2002), who used the Beta distribution to model 
binary statistical events. 
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3.2. Second-hand Information 
A second source of information in trust-modelling is information provided by other nodes. 
This source of information is referred to as second-hand information. It consists of information 
gathered by nodes as first-hand information and converted into an assessment. Due to the 
limitations of a WSN, the second-hand information is summarised before being shared. For 
example, the RFSN in (Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004) uses the Beta probability model and 
share the values of the parameters of the probability distributions as second-hand information. 
This shared information is not hard data for the node receiving the information. A proper way 
is required to incorporate this new information into the trust model by combining it with 
observed data. While some trust models build reputations purely on the basis of observations, 
most of them attempt to use the second-hand information. The reasons are obvious from a 
statistical point of view. But the interest is also motivated by the desire to speed up the 
assessment of reputations. Due to the asymmetric transactions in a network, some nodes may 
not have enough observations about all neighbouring nodes. 
 
Using shared information improves the efficiency and speed of reputation assessment, however, 
combining the two sources of information is handled differently by different trust models. For 
example, the RFSN uses the Dempster-Shafer Belief Theory. The Belief Theory is a framework for 
reasoning under uncertainty that differs from the probabilistic framework. The discussion of the 
fundamental differences between these two theories is beyond the scope of this research. 
Although the two approaches can be joined in some cases, they differ in their philosophies on 
how to treat uncertainty. The RFSN uses both of them in the same problem. We propose a 
probabilistic treatment of trust, and apply it to the case of continuous sensor data. 
 
Although a reputation system is designed to reduce the harmful effect of an unreliable or 
malicious node, such a system can be used by a malicious node to harm the network. Systems 
such as the RFSN in (Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004) and the distributed reputation-based 
beacon trust system (DRBTS) in (Srinivasan et al., 2006) are confronted with the issue of what 
second-hand information is allowed to be shared. For example, some prohibit negative 
second-hand information to be shared, in order to reduce the risk of a negative campaign by 
malicious nodes. Our proposed model incorporates all of the second-hand information. To 
resolve the issue of the validity of the information source, the information is modulated using 
the reputation of the source. This probabilistic approach rigorously answers the question of 
how to combine the two types of data in the exercise of assessing reputations in a sensor 
network. It is based on work undertaken in modelling Expert Opinion (Lindley & 
Singpurwalla, 1986; Morris, 1971; West, 1984). Expert opinions are used whenever few data are 
observed. The expert opinion is second-hand information that is merged with hard data 
according to the laws of probability. Information provided by knowledgeable sources is 
known as “expert opinion” in the statistical literature. These opinions are modulated by 
existing knowledge about the experts themselves, to provide a calibrated answer. 
 
4. The Beta Reputation System 
The Beta Reputation System was proposed by Josang and Ismail in (Jøsang & Ismail, 2002) 
to derive reputation ratings in the context of e-commerce. It was presented as a flexible 
system with foundations in the theory of statistics, and is based on the Beta probability 
density function. The Beta distribution can be used in the probability modelling of binary 
events. Let θ be a random variable representing a binary event, θ = 0; 1, and p the probability 
that the event occurs, θ = 1. Then the Beta-family of probability distributions, a continuous 
family of functions indexed by two parameters α and β, can be used to represent the 
probability density distribution of p, noted as Beta(α, β), as shown in equation (1): 
 
1 1( )( | , ) (1 )( ) ( )f p p p
     
              (1) 
 
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1; α > 0; β  > 0. If the number of outcomes where there are r occurrences and s 
non-occurrences of the event is observed, then using a Bayesian probabilistic argument, the 
probability density function of p can be expressed as a Beta distribution, where α = r + 1 and β 
= s + 1. This probabilistic mechanism is applied to model the reputation of an entity using 
events of completion of a task by the assessed entity. The reputation system counts the number 
r of successful transactions, and the number s of failed transactions, and applies the Beta 
probability model. This provides for an easily updatable system, since it is easy to update both 
r and s in the model. Each new transaction results either in r or s being augmented by 1. 
For the RFSN (Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004) Ganeriwal and Srivastava used the work of 
Josang and Ismail presented in (Jøsang & Ismail, 2002), in their trust model for WSNs. For each 
node nj, a reputation Rij can be carried by a neighbouring node ni. The reputation is embodied 
in the Beta model and carried by two parameters αij and βij. αij represents the number of 
successful transactions node ni had with nj, and βij represents the number of unsuccessful 
transactions. The reputation of node nj maintained by node ni is Rij = Beta(αij + 1, βij + 1). The 
trust is defined as the expected value of the reputation, as shown in equation (2): 
 
1( ) ( ( 1, 1)) 2
ij
ij ij ij ij
ij ij
T E R E Beta    
                (2) 
Second-hand information is presented to node ni by another neighbouring node nk. Node ni 
receives the reputation of node nj by node nk, Rkj, in the form of the two parameters αkj and 
βkj. Using this new information, node ni combines it with its current assessment Rij to obtain 
a new reputation newijR , as given in equation (3): 
 
 ( ,  )new new newij ij ijR Beta                   (3) 
where  
2
( 2)( 2)(2 )
ik kjnew
ij ij
ik kj kj ik
                        (4) 
 
2
( 2)( 2)(2 )
ik kjnew
ij ij
ik kj kj ik
                        (5) 
 
Note that node ni uses its reputation of node nk in the combination process. The authors of 
the RFSN defined how their trust model can be used in practice. They brought out some 
important points concerning the way information is to be used to avoid two major 
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problems: (i) data incest, and (ii) a game theoretic set-up. Some researchers (Agah et al., 
2004; Liu et al., 2004) have looked into the game theory aspect, which is no doubt inherent in 
a problem with malicious nodes in the network. However, a game theory solution might be 
difficult to obtain, in view of the large number of nodes. The RFSN forces the WSNs 
protocols into an exchange of information that limits any game aspect. The effectiveness of 
the notion of reputation and trust resides in the assumption that the majority of nodes in 
any neighbourhood is trustworthy, therefore creating a resilience of the system. Trust 
assessment is used to flush out the bad nodes. In combining information, the authors of the 
RFSN followed the approach of (Jøsang & Ismail, 2002), by mapping the problem into a 
Dempster-Shafer belief theory model (Shafer, 1976), solving it using the concept of belief 
discounting, and conducting a reverse mapping from belief theory to probability. In our 
work we find it unnecessary to use the Belief theory. Rather, probability theory, and the 
ensuing work on expert opinion provide a way to combine the two types of information. 
 
5. Expert Opinion Theory 
The use of expert opinion has received much attention in the statistical literature. It allows 
for the formal incorporation of informed knowledge into a statistical analysis. Expert 
opinion, or informed judgement, is often available in the form of vendor information, 
engineering knowledge, manufacturer’s knowledge, or simply an opinion formed over time. 
It is often a subjective opinion based on knowledge. Its main departure from hard data is 
that it cannot be claimed as objectively observed data. Nevertheless, it is often valuable 
information that has been formed over the course of time. In our case, reputation is offered 
to neighbouring nodes as an opinion. The node making the assessment has not observed 
that reputation, and therefore treats it as an opinion. Early work to formalise ad-hoc 
procedures for the use of expert opinion includes (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Morris, 1971). 
Morris (Morris, 1974) recognised the importance of treating the expert opinion as data, 
stating the general principle on which subsequent work was based. The topic was further 
enlarged by the Bayesian statistical community to the problem of reconciliation prior 
information from different sources (Dawid, 1987; French, 1980; Genest & Schervish, 1985; 
Lindley et al., 1979), a topic that dated back to Winkler (Winkler, 1968). Lindley (Lindley, 
1983) highlighted the theory in the statistical arena, with others following with work on 
reliability (Aboura & Robinson, 1995; Mazzuchi & Soyer, 1993; Singpurwalla, 1988), on 
maintenance optimization (Aboura, 1995; Mazzuchi & Soyer, 1996; Van Nortwijk et al., 1992) 
and on nuclear safety (Cooke, 1994).  
 
The probabilistic approach adopted in the elicitation and use of expert opinion considers the 
opinion given by the expert as data and treats it according to the laws of probability. If θ is a 
random variable, and μ represents an opinion from an expert about θ, then P(θ|μ) obtains, 
using Bayes’ theorem as discussed in appendix A, the following formula, as shown in 
equation (6): 
 
 ( | ) ( )( | ) ( )
P PP P
                (6) 
 ( ) ( | ) ( )P P P d                  (7) 
 ( | )P   is the likelihood function, and represents the analyst model of the expert's 
input 
 ( )P  is the distribution that represents any prior knowledge the analyst may have 
about the quantity of interest 
 ( )P  is the normalising constant  
 
Bayes’ theorem inverses the probability, so that the evidence μ highlights the value of θ that 
is most likely. The likelihood function ( ) ( | )L P    refers to where the expert opinion is 
modelled. As an example, consider the reliability scenario of (Aboura & Robinson, 1995). In 
it, an expert provides reliability estimates for a device or machine. The work was 
undertaken in the context of maintenance optimisation. 
 
Figure 3 shows the expert's input along the unknown reliability curve that the analyst wants 
to estimate. Each assessment by the expert is about the reliability as a time ti, in the form of a 
value 0 < ri < 1. If the expert was perfect, and assuming that the reliability at time ti is ite  , 
then 
 
itir e                   (8) 
 
 Fig. 3. Expert opinion ri for reliability at time ti 
 
However, it will not necessarily be the case, and a probability distribution is needed to 
model the input. That probability distribution is the likelihood function, in this case  
 
( , ) ( | , )iL P r                  (9) 
www.intechopen.com
Probabilistic modelling and recursive bayesian estimation of trust in wireless sensor networks 387
problems: (i) data incest, and (ii) a game theoretic set-up. Some researchers (Agah et al., 
2004; Liu et al., 2004) have looked into the game theory aspect, which is no doubt inherent in 
a problem with malicious nodes in the network. However, a game theory solution might be 
difficult to obtain, in view of the large number of nodes. The RFSN forces the WSNs 
protocols into an exchange of information that limits any game aspect. The effectiveness of 
the notion of reputation and trust resides in the assumption that the majority of nodes in 
any neighbourhood is trustworthy, therefore creating a resilience of the system. Trust 
assessment is used to flush out the bad nodes. In combining information, the authors of the 
RFSN followed the approach of (Jøsang & Ismail, 2002), by mapping the problem into a 
Dempster-Shafer belief theory model (Shafer, 1976), solving it using the concept of belief 
discounting, and conducting a reverse mapping from belief theory to probability. In our 
work we find it unnecessary to use the Belief theory. Rather, probability theory, and the 
ensuing work on expert opinion provide a way to combine the two types of information. 
 
5. Expert Opinion Theory 
The use of expert opinion has received much attention in the statistical literature. It allows 
for the formal incorporation of informed knowledge into a statistical analysis. Expert 
opinion, or informed judgement, is often available in the form of vendor information, 
engineering knowledge, manufacturer’s knowledge, or simply an opinion formed over time. 
It is often a subjective opinion based on knowledge. Its main departure from hard data is 
that it cannot be claimed as objectively observed data. Nevertheless, it is often valuable 
information that has been formed over the course of time. In our case, reputation is offered 
to neighbouring nodes as an opinion. The node making the assessment has not observed 
that reputation, and therefore treats it as an opinion. Early work to formalise ad-hoc 
procedures for the use of expert opinion includes (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Morris, 1971). 
Morris (Morris, 1974) recognised the importance of treating the expert opinion as data, 
stating the general principle on which subsequent work was based. The topic was further 
enlarged by the Bayesian statistical community to the problem of reconciliation prior 
information from different sources (Dawid, 1987; French, 1980; Genest & Schervish, 1985; 
Lindley et al., 1979), a topic that dated back to Winkler (Winkler, 1968). Lindley (Lindley, 
1983) highlighted the theory in the statistical arena, with others following with work on 
reliability (Aboura & Robinson, 1995; Mazzuchi & Soyer, 1993; Singpurwalla, 1988), on 
maintenance optimization (Aboura, 1995; Mazzuchi & Soyer, 1996; Van Nortwijk et al., 1992) 
and on nuclear safety (Cooke, 1994).  
 
The probabilistic approach adopted in the elicitation and use of expert opinion considers the 
opinion given by the expert as data and treats it according to the laws of probability. If θ is a 
random variable, and μ represents an opinion from an expert about θ, then P(θ|μ) obtains, 
using Bayes’ theorem as discussed in appendix A, the following formula, as shown in 
equation (6): 
 
 ( | ) ( )( | ) ( )
P PP P
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 ( ) ( | ) ( )P P P d                  (7) 
 ( | )P   is the likelihood function, and represents the analyst model of the expert's 
input 
 ( )P  is the distribution that represents any prior knowledge the analyst may have 
about the quantity of interest 
 ( )P  is the normalising constant  
 
Bayes’ theorem inverses the probability, so that the evidence μ highlights the value of θ that 
is most likely. The likelihood function ( ) ( | )L P    refers to where the expert opinion is 
modelled. As an example, consider the reliability scenario of (Aboura & Robinson, 1995). In 
it, an expert provides reliability estimates for a device or machine. The work was 
undertaken in the context of maintenance optimisation. 
 
Figure 3 shows the expert's input along the unknown reliability curve that the analyst wants 
to estimate. Each assessment by the expert is about the reliability as a time ti, in the form of a 
value 0 < ri < 1. If the expert was perfect, and assuming that the reliability at time ti is ite  , 
then 
 
itir e                   (8) 
 
 Fig. 3. Expert opinion ri for reliability at time ti 
 
However, it will not necessarily be the case, and a probability distribution is needed to 
model the input. That probability distribution is the likelihood function, in this case  
 
( , ) ( | , )iL P r                  (9) 
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The authors of (Aboura & Robinson, 1995) modelled it using a Beta distribution, such that 
 
( | , ) iti i iE r e                     (10) 
 
where i  and i  are inflation and bias, respectively, carried by the expert about the 
reliability at time ti. These two values reflect the analyst’s modulation of the expert opinion. 
To model several correlated inputs, a Dirichlet model is used. Once the likelihood function 
is built, then it can be used to combine the actual expert opinion with any existing 
knowledge about the random variable of interest. The analyst may not only have prior 
knowledge but also some observed data y about a random variable of interest, θ. Bayes’ 
theorem is applied to combine the three sources of information, as shown in equation (11): 
 
( | , ) ( | ) ( )( | , ) ( , )
P y P PP y P y
                  (11) 
 
One often writes, ( | , )P y   ( | , )P y   ( | )P   ( )P  , the denominator being a 
normalising constant that does not affect the combination occurring in the numerator. This 
seemingly simple operation can effectively combine many sources of information. We use it 
to model the reputation of a node when opinions about that node are provided by other 
nodes. 
 
6. GTRSSN: Gaussian Trust and Reputation System  
for Wireless Sensor Networks 
Taking into consideration the above discussion, let us assume that the wireless sensor 
network shown in Figure 4 consists of N nodes  1 2, ,...., Nn n n , and the corresponding matrix 
,[ ]i j     is given as follows: 
 
,
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0[ ] 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
i j
          
 
 
If node ni is connected to node nj, then , , 1i j j i    , otherwise it is equal to (0). Let (X) be a 
field variable monitored in the environment where the WSN is deployed. This variable, 
might represent temperature, chemical component or atmospheric value, is detected and 
estimated by the sensor nodes and it is assumed to be of a continuous nature. The nodes are 
synchronised and can report at discrete times t = 0, 1, 2, …., k. 
 Fig. 4. Network of wireless sensor nodes 
 
The random variable ( )in iX X  is the sensed value reported by node ni, i = 1, …, N. xi(t) is 
the realisation of that random variable at time t. Each node ni, i = 1, ….. , N has a time series 
(xi(t)). These time series are most likely different, as nodes are requested to provide readings 
at different times, depending on the sources of the requests. It could also be that the nodes 
provide such readings when triggered by particular events. We assume that each time a 
node provides a reading, its one-hop neighbours that route its report see that report, and 
can evaluate the reported value. For example, if node nj reports xj(t) at some time t, then 
node ni, such that ,i j = 1, obtains a copy of that report for routing purposes, and has its 
own assessment xi(t) of the sensed variable. Let yi,j(t) = xj(t)-xi(t). From the node ni 
perspective, Xi(t) is known, and Yi,j(t) = Xj(t) - Xi(t) represents the error that node nj commits 
in reporting the sensed field value Xj(t) at time t. Yi,j(t) is a random variable modelled as a 
Normal (Gaussian), as shown in equation (12): 
 
2
, ,( ) ~ ( , )i j i jY t N             (12) 
 
where   is assumed to be known (error variance), and it is the same for all nodes. If we let 
,i jy  be the mean of the observed error, as observed by ni about nj reporting, as in equation 
(13): 
 
, 1 , ( ) /
k
i j t i jy y t k           (13) 
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then 
2
, , ,( | ) ~ ( , / )i j i j i jy N y k               (14) 
 
where , ,{ ( )i j i jy y t , for all t values at which a report is issued by nj and routed through 
ni}. This is a well-known straightforward Bayesian updating where a diffuse prior is used.  
 
We let , ,i j i jy   and 2 2, /i j k  . Recall that k is node-dependent. It is the number of reports 
issued by node nj and routed through ni, and differs from node to node. We define the 
reputation as the probability density function, as in equation (15): 
 
2
, , ,( , )i j i j i jR N            (15) 
 
where , ,i j i jy   and 2 2, /i j k  are the equivalent of αij and βij in RFSN (Ganeriwal & 
Srivastava, 2004). 
 
Trust is defined differently, since we want it to remain between (0) and (1), a convention 
that seems to be unanimous among researchers, except for the occasional translation to the 
scale [-1, 1]. In our trust model, we define the trust to be the probability, as shown in 
equations (16) and (17): 
 
, ,Prob{| | }i j i jT            (16) 
 
, ,
, ,
, ,
P ro b {- < }
/ /
i j i j
i j i j
i j i j
T
y y
k k
  
   
     
  
            
            
              (17) 
 
where   is the cumulative probability distribution (cdf) of the Normal N(0, 1). As shown in 
Figure 5, the area under the Gaussian curve N( ,i j , 2,i j )  within the interval [ - ,  ] is the 
trust value. The bigger the error θij is, meaning its mean shifting to the right or left of 0, and 
the more spread that error is, the lower the trust value is. Each node ni maintains a line of 
reputation assessments composed of Tij for each j, such that , 0i j   (one-hop connection). 
Tij is updated for each time period t for which data is received from some connecting node j. 
The filled areas in Figure 5 represent the Gaussian Trust Tij in two cases. 
 
 Fig. 5. Normal (Gaussian) distribution example 
 
In addition to data observed in form of , ,{ ( )}i j i jy y t , for all t values at which a report is 
issued by nj and routed through ni}, node ni uses second-hand information in the form of 
, ,( , )s sl j l j  , s = 1, …, m, from the m nodes connected to nj and ni, as shown in Figure 6, 
below. This is an “expert opinion”, that is, soft information from external sources. Each of 
these m nodes has observed node nj reports and produced assessments of its error in the 
form of , ,( , )s sl j l j  , s = 1,…, m, and consequently Tls,j, s = 1, …, m. In using the expert 
opinion theory, one needs to modulate it. Node ni uses its own assessment of the nodes 
1 ,..., ml ln n , in the form of , ,( , )s si l i l  , s = 1, … , m, and consequently Ti,ls , s = 1, …, m. 
 
 Fig. 6. Nodes that provide second-hand information 
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Using Bayes’ theorem, the probability distribution of θi,j is obtained using the observed data 
along with the second-hand modulated information, as shown in equation (18): 
 
1 1
1 1
, , , , , ,
, , , ,
( | , ( , ),..., ( , )
,( , ),..., ( , ))
m m
m m
i j i j l j l j l j l j
i l i l i l i l
P y    
             (18) 
 
and it is proportional to the product of three terms shown in equations (19), (20) and (21): 
 
1 1
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, , , , , ,
, , , ,
( | ,( , ),...,( , ),
( , ),..., ( , ))
m m
m m
i j i j l j l j l j l j
i l i l i l i l
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            (19) 
 
1 1 1 1, , , , , , , , ,(( , ),...,( , ) | ,( , ),..., ( , ))m m m ml j l j l j l j i j i l i l i l i lP                   (20) 
 
and 
 
 1 1, , , , ,( | ( , ),...,( , ))m mi j i l i l i l i lP        (21) 
 
The first term, equation (19), reduces to , ,( |i j i jP y  ) through conditional independence, and 
is equal to the product of the likelihoods  
 
 2,1 ( , )
k
i jt N    (22) 
 
The third term, equation (21), also reduces to ,( )i jP  , due to the conditional independence of 
,i j  from 1 1, , , ,( , ),...,( , )m mi l i l i l i l    , and it represents the prior distribution of ,i j  which we 
model as a diffuse prior N(0,∞). 
 
The second term, equation (20), models the use of the second-hand information. This term 
requires some elaboration and can be reduced to the product of equation (23) through 
conditional independence arguments. 
 
 , , , , ,
1
(( , ) | , ( , ))s s s s
m
l j l j i j i l i l
s
P     

  (23) 
 
To derive , , , , ,(( , ) | ,( , ))s s s sl j l j i j i l i lP       for each s = 1, …, m, we observe the following: 
for some t's, 
 , ( ) ( )i j j ix t x t    (24) 
and for some t's 
 , ( ) ( )l j j lx t x t    (25) 
and, if all t's were the same, then 
 
 , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j j i j l l i l j i lx t x t x x x x           (26) 
But not all t's are the same, so all data are not used for all assessments. We inspire ourselves 
from this relationship to model the expert opinion likelihood. We assume that 
 
 , , ,~l j i j i l    (27) 
 , , ,~l j i j i l    (28) 
and we model 
 , , ,~ ( , )l j i j i lN var    (29) 
 
where we choose var to be inversely related to node’s ni assessment of the reputation of 
node nl, that is 
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 (30) 
 
where    is a model parameter. 
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leads to equation (32): 
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and consequently proves that equation (33) 
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is a Normal (Gaussian) distribution with mean and variance as shown in equations (34) and 
(35) respectively: 
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Using Bayes’ theorem, the probability distribution of θi,j is obtained using the observed data 
along with the second-hand modulated information, as shown in equation (18): 
 
1 1
1 1
, , , , , ,
, , , ,
( | , ( , ),..., ( , )
,( , ),..., ( , ))
m m
m m
i j i j l j l j l j l j
i l i l i l i l
P y    
             (18) 
 
and it is proportional to the product of three terms shown in equations (19), (20) and (21): 
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is a Normal (Gaussian) distribution with mean and variance as shown in equations (34) and 
(35) respectively: 
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These values , ,( , )new newi j i j  , along with , ,( , )i j i j  , are easily updatable values that represent 
the continuous Gaussian version of the , ,( , )i j i j  and , ,( , )new newi j i j  of the binary approach in 
(Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004), as derived from the approach in (Jøsang & Ismail, 2002). The 
solution presented is simple and easily computed, keeping in mind that the solution applies 
to networks with limited computational power. In the binary work, , ,( , )i j i j   are obtained 
through a Bayesian approach, while , ,( , )new newi j i j  are obtained through the combination 
approach of Belief functions. The Gaussian solution provides a full probabilistic approach in 
the case of continuous sensor data.  
 
Some would object to the use of a diffuse prior, which, in effect, forces a null prior trust 
value, regardless of the ε value. A way to remedy to this is to start with a 20 0( , )N    prior 
distribution for all θij, such that the prior trust is (1/2). This choice not only answers the 
diffuse prior issue, but also allows the choice of the parameters involved. ε can be 
determined: given μ0 and σ0, μ0 is most likely to be set to (0). Therefore, σ0 and ε determine 
each other. Once one is set, the other is automatically deducted. Note that the prior is really 
node-dependent, making our definition of trust, and therefore ε, node-dependent. In 
practice, it is most likely that all priors are tuned to the same values so that the prior trusts 
are started at some level, say (1/2), with a proper prior ,i j , as shown in equation (36):  
 
 2, 0 0~ ( , )i j N    (36) 
 
The reputation parameters ,i j and 2,i j  are presented in equations (37) and (38): 
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and the updated values are presented in equations (39) and (40) respectively: 
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Once ,newi j  and 2, newi j  are formulated, the new trust value ,newi jT  will be presented as shown 
in equation (41): 
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We call this trust and reputation system (GTRSSN), which stands for Gaussian Trust and 
Reputation System for Sensor Networks. It can be seen as an extension of the concepts of 
RFSN and DRBTS for sensor data and it introduces a full probabilistic approach to the 
combination of information in the reputation assessment. 
 
7. Simulation Results 
To verify the theory introduced in this chapter, several simulation experiments in different 
scenarios were developed. The results from the simulations conducted on the network 
shown in Figure 7, for one scenario, where only a random region from the network is 
selected to report data on every time series, are presented in this section. In all simulation 
experiments, the trust relationship between four nodes (1, 6, 7 and 13) in a sub-network of 
the fifteen-node network shown in Figure 7 is calculated. 
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We call this trust and reputation system (GTRSSN), which stands for Gaussian Trust and 
Reputation System for Sensor Networks. It can be seen as an extension of the concepts of 
RFSN and DRBTS for sensor data and it introduces a full probabilistic approach to the 
combination of information in the reputation assessment. 
 
7. Simulation Results 
To verify the theory introduced in this chapter, several simulation experiments in different 
scenarios were developed. The results from the simulations conducted on the network 
shown in Figure 7, for one scenario, where only a random region from the network is 
selected to report data on every time series, are presented in this section. In all simulation 
experiments, the trust relationship between four nodes (1, 6, 7 and 13) in a sub-network of 
the fifteen-node network shown in Figure 7 is calculated. 
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In this scenario and as stated before, it is assumed that, at each time slot a group of nodes 
are selected to report their sensed data, and when one node is sending its own reading to a 
specific node in the group, all the surrounding nodes connected to the sending node hear 
the reported value and start to send the output of that reading as a second-hand information 
to the receiving node regarding the sending node. The output of that reading between the 
sending and the receiving nodes is regarded as the direct observation, as discussed before. 
In other words, and in the case of selected sub-network, when node (7) is sending its 
reading to node (1), nodes (6) and (13) hear the reported data, use it to find the trust 
between them and node (7) and report that trust to node (1) as second-hand information 
about node (7). Node (1), at the same time, uses the reading reported directly from node (7) 
to calculate the direct trust between node (1) and node (7).  
 
7.1. No faulty or malicious nodes are present in the network 
At the beginning, it is assumed that all nodes are working properly, that no faulty or 
malicious nodes exist in the network, and report the sensed event (temperature) with 
minimum error. Figure 8 below presents the result of the simulation and shows the trust 
value between node (1) and the other nodes (6, 7 and 13). At first node (1) assesses node (13) 
based on the direct interactions only between the two nodes, without second-hand 
information, and then node (1) assesses node (13) based on the direct information between 
the two nodes and the second-hand information received from node (7) about node (13), 
with second-hand information. Node (1) performs the same assessment procedure for all 
nodes directly connected to it. 
 
It can be seen from Figure 8 that trust values between node (1) and nodes (7) and (13) are 
slightly different but they eventually all converge to the value of one. The trust value 
between node (1) and node (6) is the same in both cases, with and without second-hand 
information as there is no second-hand information for node (6). Node (6) is not connected 
to any other node other than node (1). 
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7.2. Node (13) is Faulty or Malicious 
In another experiment, the same network was simulated, but with the introduction of a 
significant error in node (13) readings, that is, node (13) is faulty or malicious. Simulation 
results are shown in Figure 9, below and, as can be seen from Figure 9, the trust value 
between node (1) and node (13) dropped to almost zero for both cases, with and without 
second-hand information, which means node (7) is assessing node (13) as a faulty or 
malicious node. The situation for node (6) is not affected, as there is no connection between 
node (6) and node (13). The interesting result here is that the trust value between node (1) 
www.intechopen.com
Probabilistic modelling and recursive bayesian estimation of trust in wireless sensor networks 397
720 725 730 735 740 745 750 755 760
725
730
735
740
745
750
755
760
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3Node 4
Node 5
Node 6
Node 7
Node 8
Node 9
Node 10
Node 11
Node 12
Node 13
Node 14
Node 15
 sensors locations
Length(m)
Wi
dth
 (m
)
 Fig. 7. Wireless Sensor Network Diagram 
 
In this scenario and as stated before, it is assumed that, at each time slot a group of nodes 
are selected to report their sensed data, and when one node is sending its own reading to a 
specific node in the group, all the surrounding nodes connected to the sending node hear 
the reported value and start to send the output of that reading as a second-hand information 
to the receiving node regarding the sending node. The output of that reading between the 
sending and the receiving nodes is regarded as the direct observation, as discussed before. 
In other words, and in the case of selected sub-network, when node (7) is sending its 
reading to node (1), nodes (6) and (13) hear the reported data, use it to find the trust 
between them and node (7) and report that trust to node (1) as second-hand information 
about node (7). Node (1), at the same time, uses the reading reported directly from node (7) 
to calculate the direct trust between node (1) and node (7).  
 
7.1. No faulty or malicious nodes are present in the network 
At the beginning, it is assumed that all nodes are working properly, that no faulty or 
malicious nodes exist in the network, and report the sensed event (temperature) with 
minimum error. Figure 8 below presents the result of the simulation and shows the trust 
value between node (1) and the other nodes (6, 7 and 13). At first node (1) assesses node (13) 
based on the direct interactions only between the two nodes, without second-hand 
information, and then node (1) assesses node (13) based on the direct information between 
the two nodes and the second-hand information received from node (7) about node (13), 
with second-hand information. Node (1) performs the same assessment procedure for all 
nodes directly connected to it. 
 
It can be seen from Figure 8 that trust values between node (1) and nodes (7) and (13) are 
slightly different but they eventually all converge to the value of one. The trust value 
between node (1) and node (6) is the same in both cases, with and without second-hand 
information as there is no second-hand information for node (6). Node (6) is not connected 
to any other node other than node (1). 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
0.5
1
Trust between node 1 and node 13
Time
Tru
st 
va
lue
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
0.5
1
Trust between node 1 and node 7
Time
Tru
st 
va
lue
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
0.5
1
Trust between node 1 and node 6
Time
Tru
st 
va
lue
 
 
with second hand information
without second hand information
 Fig. 8. All nodes are normal 
 
7.2. Node (13) is Faulty or Malicious 
In another experiment, the same network was simulated, but with the introduction of a 
significant error in node (13) readings, that is, node (13) is faulty or malicious. Simulation 
results are shown in Figure 9, below and, as can be seen from Figure 9, the trust value 
between node (1) and node (13) dropped to almost zero for both cases, with and without 
second-hand information, which means node (7) is assessing node (13) as a faulty or 
malicious node. The situation for node (6) is not affected, as there is no connection between 
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and node (7) is not affected in either case even though there is a connection between node 
(7) and node (13). Node (13) is faulty, and one would think that it could harm the reputation 
of node (7), but that was not the case, which proves that the modulation in the approach 
makes the reputation system robust to bad-mouthing attacks.  
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7.3. Node (7) and Node (13) are Faulty 
In this simulation experiment, it has been assumed that node (7) and node (13) are faulty. 
The results of the simulation are presented in Figure 5.10, showing that the trust values for 
both nodes (7) and (13) are dropping to zero in both cases. Node (6) is assumed reliable and 
the trust value associated with it is the same in both cases, as there is no connection between 
node (6) and the other faulty nodes, (7) or (13), to affect that trust value. 
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7.4. Node (6) is Faulty or Malicious 
The simulation results presented in Figure 11 below show that when node (6) is faulty or 
malicious, nothing almost will change in the trust values between node (1) and either of 
nodes (7) and (13), as there is no direct or indirect connection between them. In other words, 
when node (6) is faulty, node (1) will discover that, as it has a direct connection with node 
(6) and the direct trust with node (6) will be affected. As there is no indirect trust for node 
(6), both trust values will stay on the initial trust value or will decrease to the value of zero. 
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7.5. Node (1) is Faulty or Malicious 
It is assumed in this experiment that node (1) is faulty or malicious. Node (1) is the main 
node in the sub-network and is acting as the receiving node, and all the simulations show 
the trust relationship between node (1) and all the other nodes connected to it. As can be 
seen from Figure 5.12, the direct trust value for both nodes (7) and (13), is declining to the 
value of zero, as node 1 is faulty. That will leave the two nodes (7) and (13) to assess each 
other indirectly, which is a very interesting case again, as both nodes (7) and (13) are now 
assessing node (1) as a faulty node, so the indirect trust value for both nodes are slowly 
converging to the value of one. The trust value for node (6) is set to the initial value (0.5) and 
will decrease on both values to zero, as there is no second-hand information available to 
node (6) and node (1) is a faulty node. 
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 Fig. 12. Node (1) is a malicious node 
 
The last example shows precisely the reason the trust system is instituted. It allows the 
classification of nodes into separate sets according to their trustworthiness. In the last 
example, it is known that node (1) is faulty, since it is a simulation exercise. The results 
should clearly indicate to the network that node (1) is faulty. However, it could also be the 
case that the nodes (7) and (13) are malicious. The trust system works on the assumption 
that a majority of nodes in a neighbourhood are reliable. This principle helps purge the 
system of bad elements. In this case, at this point, it is observed that the developed trust 
system is effective in distinguishing among nodes.  
 
8. Conclusion 
It has been argued that the trust-modelling problem is characterised by uncertainty, and the 
only coherent way to deal with uncertainty is through probability. Even though some of the 
trust models introduced for sensor networks employ probabilistic solutions mixed with ad-
hoc approaches, none of them produces a full probabilistic answer to the problem. In this 
chapter we introduced a theoretically sound Bayesian probabilistic approach for calculating 
trust and reputation systems in WSNs. We introduced a new Gaussian Trust and Reputation 
System for Sensor Networks (GTRSSN), which we believe is a breakthrough in modelling 
trust in WSNs, as previous studies in WSNs focused on the trust associated with the routing 
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 Fig. 12. Node (1) is a malicious node 
 
The last example shows precisely the reason the trust system is instituted. It allows the 
classification of nodes into separate sets according to their trustworthiness. In the last 
example, it is known that node (1) is faulty, since it is a simulation exercise. The results 
should clearly indicate to the network that node (1) is faulty. However, it could also be the 
case that the nodes (7) and (13) are malicious. The trust system works on the assumption 
that a majority of nodes in a neighbourhood are reliable. This principle helps purge the 
system of bad elements. In this case, at this point, it is observed that the developed trust 
system is effective in distinguishing among nodes.  
 
8. Conclusion 
It has been argued that the trust-modelling problem is characterised by uncertainty, and the 
only coherent way to deal with uncertainty is through probability. Even though some of the 
trust models introduced for sensor networks employ probabilistic solutions mixed with ad-
hoc approaches, none of them produces a full probabilistic answer to the problem. In this 
chapter we introduced a theoretically sound Bayesian probabilistic approach for calculating 
trust and reputation systems in WSNs. We introduced a new Gaussian Trust and Reputation 
System for Sensor Networks (GTRSSN), which we believe is a breakthrough in modelling 
trust in WSNs, as previous studies in WSNs focused on the trust associated with the routing 
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and the successful performance of a sensor node in some predetermined task, that is, 
looking at binary events to model trust and the trustworthiness and reliability of the nodes 
of a WSN when the sensed data is continuous has not been addressed before. Having said 
that, introducing the sensor data as a major component of trust leads to the modification of 
node misbehaviour classification, the trust computational model and the way first-hand and 
second-hand information is formulated. These issues have been presented in this chapter. 
Also, a brief summary about the Beta reputation system and the expert opinion theory has 
been presented. A very detailed GTRSSN, which is the significant contribution of this 
research, has also been presented, with some simulation results. The simulation results 
show the implications of sensor data for the direct and indirect trust relationship between 
nodes, which helps to distinguish among nodes and purge the bad nodes from the network. 
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